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This study aims to examine market behavior towards management aggressiveness from the 
perspective of screening theory. Screening theory assumes that the market has limited 
information on companies. This study uses 852 companies taken from companies listed on the 
IDX from 2016 to 2018. This study provides empirical evidence about the response of capital 
markets to management aggressiveness. Over-aggressive management is very dangerous for the 
company. For this reason, the researcher also examines whether the board of commissioners, 
foreign institutional ownership, and the presence of auditors are capable of improving market 
response to management aggressiveness. The results provide evidence that the market does not 
respond to management aggressiveness. It  means that the screening theory is able to explain that 
the market does not consider whether management is aggressive or not in making their 
investment decisions. However, the existence of foreign institutional ownership as well as the 
existence of auditors is something that is considered by the market. The market has responded 
positively to their existence in suppressing management aggressiveness. Thus, Screening theory 
proves that the market has limited information about company management. However, they 
require different information from that provided by management in making strategic decisions. 
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All companies will strive to improve their performance. Firm value is a benchmark that is 
often used to assess company performance as measured by the market value and book 
value of the company's ordinary shares (Tseng et al., 2015). Management uses firm value 
to capture market signals for various strategies implemented by management (Kumar, 
2015).  Apparently, firm value is also able to indicate whether management has high or 
low capability (Yung & Chen, 2018). This means that the market is able to respond to the 
signals triggered by the company. 
An increase in firm values appears to be close to investment activity. In investing, 
risk is inherent in making investment decisions. In accordance with investment theory, risk 
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and rate of return are positively related, which means that a high rate of return is followed 
by a high risk, on the other hand, a low rate of return will have a low risk (Keynes, 2018). 
A high rate of return will increase firm value, ultimately attracting investors. Therefore, 
managers with firm value orientation are constantly competing to boost their performance 
to win the competition. According to Myers & Turnbull (1977), the higher the risk of 
investment planning taken by the company, the higher the risk of bankruptcy. One 
indication of bankruptcy is a continuing decline in income. Meanwhile, management as 
company manager tries to camouflage its income in financial statements when the real 
income decreases (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). The inappropriate effort to make over 
income in a short time can be done through earnings management and tax avoidance. 
Management controls all resources in the company (Goldberg, 2001) . Ownership of 
control over assets makes management act as a master in a real company. Therefore, how 
the management manages the assets is strongly influenced by the economic behaviour of 
the management, whether it is a risk taker or a risk averse. Risk taker or risk averse is 
largely determined by how management focuses their attention on critical performance 
targets (March & Shapira, 1987). Management is called risk aversion or risk taker 
depending on their choice of expected value prospects  (Wakker, 2010). This management 
character will determine the level of aggressiveness carried out by the company (Dyreng et 
al., 2010). 
The capital market often responds to management aggressiveness. However, the 
market response to management aggressiveness has had inconsistent results. Various 
measures can be used to assess management aggressiveness in making strategic decisions, 
including: marketing strategy (Kurt & Hulland, 2013), tax avoidance (Chen et al., 2014), 
working capital funding (Naqi & Siddiqui, 2020). Management aggressiveness using the 
risk choice measure is widely used to explain various strategic decisions taken by the 
company. Søreide (2009)  proved that risk averse firms are more likely to do business 
bribery than risk taker firms. In another study, risk averse companies prefer to lower their 
leverage ratio (Marwan & Sedeek, 2018), while Ting at al. (2015) found the opposite. Risk 
preference also determines the decision-making process in project-based construction 
companies (Taofeeq et al., 2020).  In fact, the risk preference related to the decision to do 
earning management in China (Bhatti et al., 2021). Most studies try to explain risk 
preference with the strategic management decisions. Meanwhile, there are still few studies 
on management aggressiveness that use the risk preference associated with the capital 
market response. whereas, the capital market community may monitor management 
aggressiveness in their investment considerations. According to the screening theory, how 
the market responds is determined by how much information the market has about the 
company. Therefore, not all information that management might consider relevant 
becomes relevant to the market. Therefore, researchers are interested in examining the 
market's response to management aggressiveness. 
Screening theory was first proposed by  Stiglitz (1975). Initially, this theory was 
mostly used to highlight how the education function of workers is a differentiating factor 
for employers. Stiglitz (1975) describes the existence of social benefits by conducting 
screening. He also wrote down some of the social benefits of screening, namely (1) 
tradeoffs. The absence of sufficient information for employers regarding the differentiating 
capabilities of workers means that the wages received often cannot be commensurate with 
the true marginal product, (2) matching. Matching problems often occur in companies, 
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when one capability can be exchanged according to user needs. For example, a salesperson 
can have capabilities in production, and vice versa, a production operator can control 
marketing. This phenomena allows for an exchange of jobs between them. This study 
provides insight into whether the capital market community also considers information 
about management aggressiveness in making their investment decisions. Thus, this study 
seeks to provide evidence whether management aggressiveness is relevant information for 
investors according to the perspective of screening theory 
The determination of risk sometimes does not depend on action. But it is more 
directed at how someone maximizes an opportunity  (Drucker, 1999). Management who 
has the courage to take the opportunity, in various risky decisions that aim to win in the 
competition, will achieve an encouraging rate of return and growth in the long run 
(Damodaran, 2007). According to Drucker (1999), there are three opportunities that can be 
maximized by management, namely: (1) additive (tends to utilize the resources owned by 
the company and does not change the characteristics of a business entity) (2) 
complementary (use of opportunities that have the potential to change the characteristics or 
structure of the company), and (3) breakthrough (maximizing opportunities that will 
fundamentally change the total characteristics and capacity of the company). Meanwhile, 
Yates (1992) has another opinion about risk taking. According to him, risk taking is more 
appropriate with regard to decision issues. He revealed three components of risk, namely: 
loss, the significance of loss, and the uncertainty associated with loss. 
Different views on risk taking are how to view a risk. When examined further, risk 
taking tends to be a person's action to address something because of the perception of 
possible outcomes, benefits, or costs (Trimpop, 1994). Meanwhile, Atkinson (1957) 
proved that risk-taking behavior is more motivated by the actors' motivation regarding 
decision making. Risk taking is often perceived positively in the millennial era because it 
is part of modernity (Zinn, 2020). 
Management aggressiveness frequently indicates the level of management 
capability (Yung & Chen, 2018). High-capability management tends to take a risk taker 
position (Kaplan & Sorensen, 2016). The question is whether the management's 
performance is also considered by the market or the investor community. Screening theory 
believes that investors lack information related to management quality  (Stiglitz, 1975). For 
this reason, often the management capabilities proxied by management aggressiveness are 
often not seen by investors (Kaur & Singh, 2017; Yorke et al., 2016). Meanwhile, there are 
other findings that the market dislikes management that is too aggressive by taking high-
risk diversified ventures (Golec, 1988; Karpavičius & Yu, 2018). Therefore,  
H1: Management's aggressiveness in dealing with risks affects firm value. 
 
The board of commissioners is very likely to influence the economic behaviour of 
management (Chatterjee, 2019). There are several characteristics of board members, such 
as the involvement of women and board interlocks. Most people presume that women tend 
to make ethical decisions (Franke et al., 1997). Social Role Theory explains that there are 
differences in behaviour between women and men (A. H. Eagly, 1997). Gender has the 
potential to improve a company's reputation (Kaur & Singh, 2017). However, the presence 
of women on board members has a negative effect on investment efficiency, because 
women board members tend to be risk averse (Hurley & Choudhary, 2020) especially 
unmarried women and widows ((Thackeray, 2018). Another study found women's 
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involvement even suppressed management in terms of overinvestment (Mirza et al., 2020; 
Shin et al., 2020). In fact, the viewpoint of women is not always correct. One study found 
no link between gender involvement and decisions in business (Fernández-Temprano & 
Tejerina-Gaite, 2020). In a feminism perspective, the choice to become an averse or a risk 
taker is more precisely determined by the emotional level of stress and anxiety (Marlow et 
al., 2014), as well as personal identity (age, race and number of children) (Jianakoplos & 
Bernasek, 1998). In addition to gender, board interlocks have the potential to play a role as 
a trigger for management behaviour, because board interlocks enable the dissemination of 
knowledge, resources and practices (Whitler & Puto, 2020). The interlock board provides 
insight into various strategic decisions including the emergence of new products 
(Srinivasan et al., 2018). The existence of the interlock board can be used as social capital 
in the company (Fennema & Tillie, 2008).  
H2: The characteristics of the board of commissioners moderate the relationship between 
management aggressiveness and firm value.  
 
The company always strives to build a reputation through a good image. Reputation is 
socially constructed from non-observers (Suchman, 1995). The investor community often 
has positive perceptions of institutional ownership (Shi et al., 2017), because of its ability 
to lessen management aggressiveness (An et al., 2014; Ying et al., 2017). The investor 
community believes that foreign institutional ownership will create an atmosphere that 
encourages management to innovate (Bena et al., 2017), minimizing local culture and 
economic policy uncertainty (Deng et al., 2018) Thus,  
H3: Management aggressiveness with moderation of foreign institutional ownership affects 
firm value. 
 
The independent auditor is expected to mediate the relationship between agent and 
principal. Theory of inspired confidence states that an auditor should not disappoint 
rational outsiders (Hayes et al., 2014). In fact, auditors are often expected to prevent fraud 
in companies (Jeppesen, 2019). Thus, auditors are actually also appointed to become 
police, as stated in the policeman theory (Hayes et al., 2014). Comprehensive professional 
capabilities enable auditors to understand the company's operations well, so that it is 
possible to give advice to management (Yang, 2020). For this reason, it is likely that 
auditors are also able to influence management aggressiveness.  




This research is quantitative because it seeks to find a relationship between audit quality 
and risk taking in creating value in business units using deductive logic. Meanwhile, the 
unit of analysis used in this research is all non-financial business entities listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) during 2016-2018. Researchers used non-probability 
purposive sampling with purposive sampling type. From the population, we used 1674 
companies to observe. The dependent variable in this study is firm value or company value 
obtained from the difference between the book value of ordinary shares and the market 
value of the company's common stock. The independent variable or independent variable 
in this study is risk taking or management aggressiveness in taking risks. 
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Measurement of risk is carried out through the standard deviation of the stock return. 
Return is positively related to risk, meaning that high return indicates the high risk of the 
company. Meanwhile, the moderating variables in this study are the characteristics of the 
board of commissioners, foreign institutional ownership and audit quality. The board of 
commissioner’s proxies are the board diversity and board interlock. The board diversity is 
measured by a dummy variable where the number 1 is given if a woman occupies a 
position on the board of commissioners while others are assigned a number of 0, while 
board interlock is measured using the proportion of commissioners who work as 
commissioners in other companies to the total board of commissioners. The Foreign 
institutional ownership is measured by the proportion between ownership or shares owned 
by foreign institutions and the total shares outstanding. Audit quality is proxied by the size 
of the public accounting firm as measured by the interval variable. 0 for companies audited 
by local KAP, 1 for companies audited by non-big four foreign KAP and 2 for companies 
audited by big four foreign ACCOUNTING FIRM. The control variable is leverage which 
is measured using the ratio of total company debt to total assets of the company and 
profitability of Return on Assets (ROA) which is measured using the ratio of current year 
earnings to total assets. This study uses the following four models: 
 
Model 1 : 
                                                                                                 (1) 
 
Model 2 : 
                                                          
                                                                                         (2) 
 
Model 3 : 
                                                        (3) 
 
Model 4 : 
                                                      (4) 
 
FVit   = Firm Value 
β0   = Constant 
RTit   = Risk Taking 
BDit   = Board Diversity 
BIiit   = Board Interlock 
FIOit   = Foreign Institutional Ownership 
AQit    = Audit Quality 
LEVit   = Leverage 
PROFit   = Profitability 
β1 – β7    = Correlation coefficient 
eit   = Error coefficient 
 
This study uses a panel data model with the Generalized Least Square (GLS) method. 
Previously, researchers used Ordinary Least Square (OLS). However, researchers found 
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problems in heteroscedasticity. The consequence of this heteroscedasticity is that the OLS 
method will still meet the unbiased criteria, but the variants obtained will tend to enlarge so 
that it is no longer efficient (Maziyya et al., 2015). According to Greene (2012), the 
method that can be used in models that experience heteroscedasticity problems is 
Generalized Least Square (GLS). 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This study uses 1674 companies consisting of all non-financial sector companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2016 to 2018. Then the researchers limit the 
sampling by eliminating companies that do not use the rupiah currency in their financial 
statements, not providing stock market value data. complete in the source used by the 
researcher, does not provide complete financial reports, does not provide stock market 
value and does not provide information on foreign shareholders, board of commissioners 
information and complete financial reports. After eliminating all companies that do not 
meet the criteria, 822 companies were not used in this study, so it can be concluded that 
this study used a total of 852 companies as the research sample. Table 1 is the results of 
descriptive statistical tests carried out on the finances of companies that meet the 
requirements on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. Furthermore, 
companies that use local ACCOUNTING FIRM services (36 companies), affiliated with 
Non Big-4 (533 companies), and affiliated Big-4 (283 companies). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variable Scale Ratio 
 
FV RT BD BI FIO LEV PROF
Mean -4.624.732 0.123976 0.129831 0.344190 0.169074 0.514416 0.080842
Median 3.538.391 0.094409 0.000000 0.333333 0.000000 0.462860 0.030000
Maximum 59061.87 1.388.511 1.000.000 1.500.000 3.132.808 6.827.618 3.658.547
Minimum -4511855. -0.116534 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 -1.470.000
Std. Dev. 154687.6 0.129577 0.190846 0.315490 0.281428 0.484812 1.266.630
Skewness -2.908.601 4.642.895 1.516.209 0.460050 2.538.200 7.267.813 2.815.255
Kurtosis 8.480.027 3.469.556 5.273.120 2.190.146 1.737.513 7.886.676 8.116.808
Jarque-Bera 25468178 38724.61 5.098.734 5.333.694 8.250.708 211830.3 23328286
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Observations 852 852 852 852 852 852 852  
Source: processed industrial data 
When testing classical assumptions, the researcher found a heteroscedasticity problem. 
Furthermore, researchers used GLS to analyze data. Table 2 shows the results of the 
regression test. The regression test results in model 1 in this study indicate the constant 
value of model 1 is -2062.77, which means that if the independent variable and control 
variable have no value or have a value of 0 then the firm value will decrease by 2062.77 
units. The RT variable has a positive influence on the FV value so that if the RT value goes 
up or down by 1 unit, there will be a unidirectional change in the FV value of 1507,131 
assuming the other variables are fixed. . Based on the regression test performed on model 
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1, the F-statistic value in this model is 36.22979 while the probability is 0.000000. This 
means that the RT, LEV and PROF variables as independent variables together have a 
significant effect on firm value as the dependent variable at the 1% level. From the table, 
the F-statistic value in this model is 36.22979 while the probability is 0.000000. This 
means that the RT, LEV and PROF variables as independent variables together have a 
significant effect on firm value as the dependent variable at the 1% level. It can be 
concluded that the independent variable is able to estimate the dependent variable well. In 
model 1, the RT variable has a probability above 0.05, which is equal to 0.1963, so this 
variable has no partial effect on firm value as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 2. Regression Test 
 
Variabel
Koef. t Prob. Koef. t Prob. Koef. t Prob. Koef. t Prob.
C -2.062.772 -1.129.255 -1.503.605 -3.392.121
RT 1.507.131 1.363.518 0.1731 1.566.761 0.240762 0.8098 2083 7.678.014 0.0000 -3.570.221 -2.799.483 0.0052
BD -1.130.213 -2.810.782 0.0051
BI 4.593.130 1.535.923 0.1249
BDxRT 2.150.787 1.948.781 0.0517
BIxRT -1.653.555 -0.636175 0.5248
FIO 1.516.325 6.848.275 0.0000
FIOxRT -5.090.810 -9.258.903 0.0000
AQ 5.513.824 9.931.581 0.0000
AQxRT -6.793.612 -4.411.471 0.0000
LEV (Kontrol 1) 2.301.950 2.352.665 0.0189 1.650.753 4.516.628 0.0000 1.510.354 4.385.919 0.0000 6.759.034 1.033.931 0.0000





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.110474 0.052888 0.069407 0.382269
0.113610 0.060679 0.074875 0.385899
36.22979 7.788.716 1.369.423 1.063.245
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  
Source: processed industrial data 
 
The regression test in model 2 shows that the constant value of this equation is -1129,255, 
meaning that if the independent and variable variables do not have a value or have a value 
of 0 then the Firm value will decrease by 1129,255 units. The BDXRT variable has a 
positive influence on the FV value so that if the BDXRT value increases or decreases by 1 
unit, the FV value will increase or decrease by 2150,787 units, assuming the other 
variables are constant. While the BIXRT variable has a negative effect on the FV value, if 
the BIXRT value increases or decreases by 1 unit, the FV value will decrease or increase 
by 1653,555 units, assuming the other variables are constant. The F-statistic value in model 
2 is 7.788716 while the probability is 0.000000. This shows that RT, BD, BI, BDXRT, 
BIXRT, PROF and LEV as independent variables together have a significant effect on firm 
value as the dependent variable. For the t test in model 2, the RT, BI, BIXRT and BDXRT 
variables have a probability greater than 0.05, so it can be concluded that these two 
variables do not partially affect firm value as the dependent variable. While the variables 
BD, LEV and PROF have a probability of less than 0.05, which means that these two 
variables have a partial effect on firm value. 
The regression test results in model 3 show a constant value of -1503,605, meaning 
that if the independent and variable variables do not have a value or have a value of 0, the 
firm value will decrease by 1503,605 units. The FIOXRT variable has a coefficient of -
5090,810 which means that FIOXRT has a negative effect on the FV value so that if the 
FIOXRT value goes up or down by 1 unit, the FV value will decrease or increase by 
 Kristabel & Wijaya. Does The Market Respond... 
33   Copyright@2021 AKRUAL: Jurnal Akuntansi 
 
5090,810 units assuming the other variables are constant. The F-statistic value in model 3 
is 13,69423 while the probability is 0.000000. This shows that RT, FIO, FIOXRT, PROF 
and LEV as independent variables together have a significant effect on firm value as the 
dependent variable at the 1% level. It can be concluded that the independent variable is 
able to estimate the dependent variable well. In model 3, all independent variables, namely 
RT, FIO, FIOXRT, LEV and PROF have a probability of less than 0.05, it can be 
concluded that all independent variables in model 3 have a partial effect on firm value as 
the dependent variable. 
The result of regression model 4 shows that the constant value of this equation is -
3392,121, meaning that if the independent and variable variables have no value or 0 then 
the Firm value will decrease by 3392,121 units. The AQXRT variable has a coefficient of -
6793,612, which means that the AQXRT variable has a negative effect on the FV value so 
that if the AQXRT value goes up or down by 1 unit, the FV value will change in the 
direction of 6793,612 units, assuming the other variables are fixed. The F-statistic value in 
model 4 is 106.3245 while the probability is 0.000000. This shows that RT, AQ, AQxRT, 
PROF and LEV as independent variables together have a significant effect on firm value as 
the dependent variable at the 1% level. It can be concluded that the independent variable is 
able to estimate the dependent variable well. In model 4, all independent variables, namely 
RT, AQ, AQXRT, LEV and PROF have a probability of less than 0.05, it can be concluded 
that all independent variables in model 4 have a partial effect on firm value as the 
dependent variable. 
Screening theory assumes that the market has little information about performance 
management, so it is possible to look for other sources to obtain information (Sanders & 
Boivie, 2004). Hypothesis 1 attempts to highlight whether management aggressiveness is 
considered by the investor community to make economic decisions. The results show that 
the market does not pay attention to the difference between aggressive and non-aggressive 
management, so they treat it the same. Based on the test, the coefficient of the RT variable 
is 1507,131, while the probability is 0.1731, so hypothesis 1 in this study is rejected. This 
indicates that management aggressiveness is not a differentiator for actors in the capital 
market. Thus, this study actually provides information that management aggressiveness is 
not a determinant of investors' decisions regarding market prices, so they see no difference 
between aggressive and less aggressive management. This means, there is a possibility that 
stock players do not screen the aggressiveness of the company's management, so they will 
ignore (indifference) with quality (the aggressiveness that management tries to show). This 
study supports the applicability of the screening theory in the investor community. Several 
studies show the incomplete information held by capital market investors, including those 
related to divestments carried out by management (Bergh et al., 2020), corporate 
sociopolitical activism (Bhagwat et al., 2020). 
BOC  is an organ that is expected to provide advice to management and to monitor 
strategic management decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To 
carry out its function properly, the board of commissioners needs conducive atmosphere 
(Kosnik, 1987). There are various factors that are suspected of providing conducive 
conditions for the board of commissioners. One of the characteristics of the board of 
commissioners that can bring benefits to the company is board diversity and interlock. 
Hypothesis 2 aims to see whether the board of commissioners as a factor originating from 
internal companies is able to strengthen or weaken the relationship between management 
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aggressiveness in dealing with corporate risk and the creation of firm value or firm value. 
Board diversity (BD) and board interlocks (BI). Based on the tests that have been done, the 
BDXRT variable shows a significance level of 0.0517 and a coefficient of 2150,787. While 
the BIXRT variable has a significance level of 0.5248 and a coefficient of -1653.555, then 
hypothesis 2 in this study is rejected. This shows that board diversity and board interlocks 
cannot moderate the relationship between management aggressiveness and firm value. 
The board diversity is calculated from the percentage of women to all members of 
the board of commissioners. Social role theory believes that women have special 
capabilities that men do not have, thus affecting how their social behavior is (Eagly et al., 
2000)  The availability of women has the potential to improve company performance by 
encouraging companies to develop innovations (Attah-Boakye et al., 2020). However, 
sometimes the presence of women does not improve the conduciveness of BOD to 
encourage or discourage management aggressiveness (Damak, 2018). This research does 
not support social role theory. The image of the woman on the board of commissioners is 
apparently not quite visible to investors. For investors, the presence or absence of women 
in the BOD does not have any impact on them. 
The existence of boards interlock is expected to create added value in the form of 
network expansion between companies (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). This is actually a 
representation of social capital (Goncalves et al., 2019). This study proves that the 
interlock board fails to build social capital in the company. This means that the board 
interlock has no effect on the board of commissioners to carry out the function of 
monitoring strategic management activities, including management aggressiveness. 
Information asymmetry is still ongoing and is unable to make the market respond to the 
aggressiveness of risk by management. This shows that the board interlock is not able to 
narrow the information asymmetry, so that the market still does not respond to 
management aggressiveness that occurs and does not have an impact on firm value. 
The foreign Institutional Ownership is expected to provide added value to the 
company. FIO can encourage company innovation and the investor community responds 
by increasing the number of share sales (Bena et al., 2017). Institutional ownership is 
considered to reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders 
(Ajina et al., 2015). Hypothesis 3 aims to prove empirically whether Foreign Institutional 
Ownership (FIO) (company external factors) is able to influence the relationship between 
management aggressiveness and firm value creation. This foreign institutional ownership 
is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares owned by foreign institutions to the total 
shares outstanding. Based on the tests that have been done, the FIOXRT variable has a 
significance level of 0.0000 and a coefficient of -5090.810, then hypothesis 3 in this study 
is accepted. This means that FIO can negatively moderate the relationship between 
management aggressiveness and firm value. In other words, the FIO is able to make the 
market respond negatively to this management aggressiveness. This occurs because even 
though on a small scale foreign institutional ownership has a role in increasing voluntary 
disclosure and transparency to the public (Liang et al., 2012). The impact, the higher the 
level of foreign institutional ownership in the company, the narrower the information 
asymmetry, so that the market will respond to management aggressiveness that occurs in 
the company. The narrowing of information asymmetry is due to the active role of foreign 
institutional investors who are capable of improving corporate governance (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011; Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Foreign institutional ownership encourages companies 
 Kristabel & Wijaya. Does The Market Respond... 
35   Copyright@2021 AKRUAL: Jurnal Akuntansi 
 
to act more conservatively (Khalil et al., 2019). In addition,  foreign institutional 
ownership increases control over management performance (Li et al., 2020) . High control 
is able to suppress agency problems (Aghion et al., 2013). It can be concluded that foreign 
institutional ownership is able to harmonize information between managers and company 
owners, so that the picture of the company's condition becomes more transparent to the 
market. The capital market responds to this by correcting company value in the form of a 
decrease. This finding indicates that the market responds to the influence of foreign 
institutional ownership on management aggressiveness 
Screening theory places more emphasis on various signals that they believe are 
closely related to various unobservable elements (Gottschalk, 2018). One element that is 
often believed by the investor community is the quality of auditors. The higher rank 
accounting firms tend to perform better than lower ones (Francis & Yu, 2009; Huang et al., 
2019). The question is whether the market sees auditor involvement in influencing 
management aggressiveness. For this reason, hypothesis 4 seeks to prove empirically 
whether audit quality as an external factor of the company can have a greater influence on 
the relationship of management aggressiveness in facing risks to firm value. The proxy 
used to measure audit quality in this study is the size of the public accounting firm. Based 
on tests that have been carried out by the AQXRT variable, which has a significance level 
of 0.000 and a coefficient of -6793,612, then hypothesis 4 in this study is accepted. This 
means that auditors are able to suppress management aggressiveness and are responded to 
by the investor community. Auditors as credibility signalers were welcomed positively by 
the investor community (Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). From the empirical results, the 
market does not like overly aggressive management. The auditors prove that their 
existence is able to suppress management behavior and are responded to by investors. 
Audit is able to control management's actions in managing the company and will be 
accounted for in the financial statements that will be audited. The size of the accounting 
firm turns out to be influential in reducing the influence of management aggressiveness. 
This study proves that auditors are able to play their role as Sherlock Holmes in the 
company (Hüpkes, 2006). In the end, the existence of qualified auditors can mediate 
conflicts between agents and principals (ElKelish, 2018; Safdar et al., 2019). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the research and discussion that has been done above, it can be concluded that 
the investor community ignores management aggressiveness that is proxied by firm value. 
Furthermore, whether the management background is not considered by the investor 
committee. The results of further studies show that board diversity and board interlock are 
not able to moderate the relationship between management aggressiveness and firm value. 
Foreign institutional ownership and audit quality can negatively moderate the relationship 
between management aggressiveness and firm value. Both are able to increase supervision 
and control so that ultimately suppress asymmetry so that the market responds to 
management aggressiveness in the form of decreasing company value. 
This research is only limited to 3 periods, namely 2016 to 2018. Due to time and data 
limitations, there are several objects that cannot be used and must be removed from the 
sample so that the number of samples used in this study is limited to 852 samples only. In 
AKRUAL: Jurnal Akuntansi            Vol 13, issue 1, October 2021 
p-ISSN: 2085-9643              DOI: 10.26740/jaj.v13n1.p26-40  
e-ISSN: 2502-6380              https://journal.unesa.ac.id/index.php/aj 
36 
 
future studies, it is recommended that the period used in the study be longer so that more 
samples are used. This will help reflect the real situation. The control variables used in this 
study only consisted of two variables, namely leverage and profitability. We recommend 
that the control variables used by researchers as a comparison are more, for example, the 
dividend payout ratio or operational cash flow. In addition, this study only uses board of 
commissioners' diversity and interlock as proxies to represent the characteristics of the 
board of commissioners. The further researchers can add other proxies to measure the 
characteristics of the board of commissioners in order to describe real conditions such as 
independence, size of public accounting firms and role duality. Furthermore, this study 
also only uses the size of the public accounting firm as a proxy to represent the audit 
quality variable. Advanced researchers can add proxies to measure audit quality in order to 
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